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IN THE SUPREtv'1E COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY G. HEATII].fAN, 
Plain tiff -Appellant, 
v. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, Law F:irm 
of the follo,ving partners: 
IIAROLD P. FABIAN, BEVE,RLY 
S. CLENDENIN, RENDELL N. 
M:ABEY, PE:TER W. BILLINGS, 
SANFORD M. STODDARD, AL-
BERT J. COLTON, DUDLE,Y 
Al\fOSS, RALPH I-I. MILLER, K. J. 
HOLDSvVORTI-I, BRYCE E. ROE, 
ALLEN KENT SHEARER, SHIR-






Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Ray VanCott, Jr., Judge, 
Harrv G. Heathman 
P. o." Box 15285 
Salt Lake City, "l~tah 
ProSe 
------ --o···_·--·-
John H. Snow 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE _________________________________ _ 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT .... ---------------------------------------- 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL________________________________________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------ ·----------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT -----------------------------------------·--------------·--------------------------- 5 
Point 1-The District Court correctly granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss the amended complaint and its judg-
ment should therefore be affirmed________________________________________ 5 
CO·NCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
CASES CITED 
Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 
122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d. 514 .... ---------------------------------------------- 12 
Intermi'll v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 P. 2d. 157·----------------------------- 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 (a) (2) ------------------------ 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY G. HEATHMAN, 
Pl.aintiff -Appellant, 
v. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, Law Firm 
of the following partners: 
HAROLD P. FABIAN, BEVERLY 
S. CLENDENIN, R E N D E L L N. 
MABEY, PE!TER W. BILLINGS, 
SANFORD M. STODDARD, AL-
BERT J. COLTON, DUDLE,Y 
Al\fOSS, RALPH H. MILLER, K. J. 
HOLDSWORTH, BRYCE E. ROE, 
ALLEN KENT SHEARER, SHIR-






NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued the defendant law firm, and one of 
its secretaries, for money damages allegedly sustained 
as a result of the manner in which defendants conducted 
a portion of the defense against plaintiff's earlier suit 
against Sumner J. Hatch, a Salt Lake City attorney. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., Judge, granted defendants' motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's amended complaint and denied plaintiff's mo-
t~ion for leave to file a second amended complaint, all 
as shown by the judgment of February 6, 1962 (R. 21). 
R,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the judgment of 
dismissal and to grant him permission to file a second 
amended complaint. 
STATEJ\tfEN,T OF FACTS 
To understand plaintiff's contentions on this appeal, 
it is necessary to refer to a portion of the record on 
appeal in the earlier case of Ha"rry G. Heathman v. 
Sumner J. Hatch, Supreme Court Case No. 9593, which 
record is still in this Court. 
References to that record will be by case number 
and page of that record (for example, No. 9593, R. 100). 
All other record references \\rill refer to the lower court 
record in the instant case. 
Plaintiff sued Sumner J. llatch in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 1285H9, and when the file 
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3 
revealed no appearance on behalf of the defendant, the 
clerk entered a default certificate (No. 9593, R. 118). 
On the, srune day, Hatch's attorneys, the defendants 
herein, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (No. 
9593, R. 119) and the next day they filed a notice of 
motion, with affidavit attached, giving notice that they 
would, on the day set forth in the notice, move the court 
for an order striking the default certificate and setting 
aside the default, it being represented by the affidavit 
that a copy of the motion to dismiss had been mailed to 
plaintiff by defendants on the day prior to the default 
(No. 9593, R. 120). 
The hearing on these matters, in which the court 
received evidence and heard argument, came on before 
District Court Judge Aldon J. Anderson on January 19, 
1961, as shown by the transcript thereof (No. 9593, R. 
178, et seq.). On January 24, 1961, Judge Anderson 
signed aJ1 order striking the default certificate and set-
itng aside the default, the defendant "having satisfied 
the court and having shown good cause that said entry 
of default should be set aside in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 55 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." In the same order the court also denied 
plaintiff's motion for default judgment (No. 9593. R. 
l-+7). 
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Three days later, plaintiff commenced the instant 
suit by his complaint (R. 1), which was followed, before 
a responsive pleading was due or filed, by an amended 
complaint (R. 4, 5 and 6). 
In the arnended complaint, plaintiff claimed the 
affidavit attached to the notice of motion (No. 9593, R. 
120) in H ea.thman v. Hatch was false and that this "false 
pleading'' was thereafter "maintained" by the defendants 
up to and including the date of the hearing before Judge 
Anderson. It was further alleged some of defendants 
discussed the default certificate and the motion to dis-
miss with other District Judges prior to that hearing. 
Plaintiff then contended that this alleged conduct by 
defendants prevented him from ''getting default judg-
ment signed" and violated "rights and privileges", not 
otherwise specified, to which plaintiff claims he is en-
titled by the Constitution and laws of this state (R. 6). 
Defendants filed a 1notion to dismiss upon the 
ground that the amended complaint failed to state a claim 
on which relief could he granted against the defendants 
or any of them, and upon the further ground that the 
amended eomplaint constituted a eollateral attack on the 
order of Judge Anderson dated January 24, 1961 (R. 8). 
Defendants' 1not,ion was heard and granted by Judge 
Ray Yan Cott. ~T r., February 5. 1962. Plaintiff then 
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moved in open court for leave to file a second amended 
complaint, which motion was denied. These rulings were 
formalized by a judgment of dismissal made and entered 
hy the lower court February 6, 1962 (R. 21). 
From this judgn1ent plaintiff appeals. 
ARGUMENT' 
POINT 1. 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFEN-
DANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND ITS J U D G MEN T SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
AFFIRMED. 
The amended complaint is based entirely upon the 
alleged improper conduct of the defendants during the 
time the parties in the case of Heathman v. Hatch were' 
concerned with the problem of the default certificate 
which had been entered by the clerk at the request of 
the plaintiff. 
Because of this alleged conduct, plaintiff claims he 
was deprived of a default judgment, and it is his apparent 
contention, as revealed more fully from his brief, that 
he was entitled to a default judgment as a matter of 
right and as a part of the privileges and rights under the 
organic and statutory law of this state. As admitted by 
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plaintiff in his brief (Page 2), he· had sued Mr. Hat~b 
for alleged malpractice, and his complaint against Hatch 
revealed a demand for unliquidated damages for such 
alleged malpractice. (No. 959.3, R. 114-a.) 
As is shown by Rule 55 (a) ( 2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, such a claim for damages, not being for a sum 
ce:rtain or for a sum which can he made certain by com-
putation, cannot be reduced to judgment until application 
is made to the District Court which "may conduct such 
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper." 
It is thus seen that plaintiff had no "right" to a 
judgment by default without proceeding further than is 
shown by this record. 
Even if plaintiff had an absolute right to a judgment 
by default, under the circumstances he has set forth, he 
has alleged no facts, nor can facts be inferred from his 
pleading, that show that any eonduet of the defendants 
prevented surh judgment. 
Instead, his amended complaint is replete with broad 
and sweeping aecusations, all of ''"hich had been fully 
aired, and decided adve,rsely to plaintiff, by the District 
Court only a few days prior to the institution of the 
instant suit. 
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Although plaintiff has the burden of showing that 
his alleged claim entitles him to relief, he has cited no 
ea~P. and none has been found by defendants, holding 
that lawyers who prevail on behalf of one party in a 
proceeding thereby become liable to the opposing party, 
particularly where the claim by the loser of improper 
conduct by the lawyers has been expressly considered 
and rejected hy a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The mere statement of the proposition reveals its 
absurdity. A holding to the contrary would render 
rneaningless the exercise of ·wise discretion by trial courts 
whose duty it is to supervise the conduct of counsel who 
appear before them. 
Further, la''~Ters whose conduct is examined and 
approved by the trial courts should not thereupon be 
subjected to irresponsible attack by t:he opponents of 
their clients, for to permit such attack would endanger 
every citizen's right to the wise and aggressive repre-
sentation by eounsel of his choice. 
It is therefore clear that plaintiff's amended com-
plaint does not state a claim on which relief can be 
granted and the trial court's ruling to that effect was 
proper. But, as will be seen, the decision of the trial 
court can be, and should be. upheld on a further ground. 
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The facts, as shown by this record and the record in 
No. 9593, re·veal that District Judge Aldon J. Anderson, 
after .a full hearing, concluded that the default certificate 
ought to be set aside (No. 9593, R. 231). The ruling of the 
court was made under the provisions of Rule 55 (c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, it having appeared to the court 
that "good cause" had been shown as required by the 
rule (No. 9593, R. 147). 
Judge Anderson's ruling was made from the bench 
January 19, 1961 (No. 9593, R. 231). The formal order 
(No. 9593, R. 14 7) was signed January 24, 1961, and on 
that same day plaintiff filed a second amended complaint 
in the same case (No. 9593, R. 141-146), again complain-
ing, among other things, about the san1e allegedly false 
affidavit filed by defendant and "allowed to stand against 
plaintiff.'' 
Three days later, plaintiff filed a third runended 
complaint, in which he amended the allegation concerning 
the affidavit, so that it ''Tas then contended that Mr. 
Hatch ''through his attorneys" (the defendants in the 
instant case) filed the claimed false affidavit (No. 9593, 
R. 152). 
25 days later plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit 
against Mr. Hatch and, on the srune day, filed a new 
action .aginst him under another case number in the Dis-
triet Court. The new action, civil case No. 129540, again 
a.RRPrted the contention that Hatch through his attorneys 
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(the defendants in the instant case) filed and maintained 
a false pleading with an annexed affidavit (No. 9593, 
R. 1). 
Plaintiff then amended his new complaint twice, but 
the new pleadings contain no reference to the claimed 
false pleading or affidavit, and an examinati.on of plain-
tiff's brief and the record in Case No. 9593 reveals that 
plaintiff did not thereafter pursue the point. 
From the foregoing factual reeitation, and from the 
statement of facts previously set forth, it is clear that: 
(1) The claims made by plaintiff in the instant 
case are the same as those he unsuccessfully main-
tained before .Judge Anderson in the hearing of 
January 19, 1961. 
( 2) The order by Judge Anderson signed 
January 24, 1961, constituted a formal ruling that 
the court had rejected the very claims that plaintiff 
now asserts in the instant suit. 
( 3) Plaintiff did not ask Judge Anderson to 
reconside·r his ruling by motion or otherwise, and 
he did not attempt, throughout his appeal, to obtain 
a reversal thereof. 
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( 4) Instead, he asserted the same claim by 
amended pleadings but thereafter abandoned the 
claim in each of the suits against Mr. Hatch. 
( 5) By the present suit, therefore, plaintiff 
seeks to avoid and evade the effect of the ruling of 
the court, and as such, his action constitutes a col-
lateral attack upon Judge Anderson's order and 
should not be countenanced by this court. 
The law has provided a method by which a litigant 
may obtain relief against an erroneous or improper 
judgment. In Interm:ill v. N.ash (1938), 94 Utah-271, 75 
P.2d 157, this court outlined the course a dissatisfied 
litigant must follow: 
"If he does not test the soundness of the 
judgment by the methods law has provided for 
that purpose, he cannot question or assail the 
same for errors in the judg1nent, or the proceed-
ing in which it ·was entered when in another pro-
ceeding it is pleaded or produced in evidence 
against hiin." 
The rea.Ron for the rule is clearly stated by this court: 
"The courts, functioning to detennine and 
settle property rights, upon which persons may 
rely and the security of society be built, should 
·enjoy, in their forn1al pronouncements, every 
possible degree of conclusiveness. To permit 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
their determinations to be lightly regarded or 
easily evaded would render them nugatory, and 
be a source of litigation and friction rather than 
to put an end thereto." 
T·ested by the foregoing rules, it is clear that plain-
tiff now seeks to obtain damages upon contentions which 
have already been rejected by a court in another proceed-
ing, which rejection he did not choose to attaak directly, 
and he cannot now, under cover of this proceeding, ask 
this or any court to grant him relief which would have 
the effect of overturning the considered judgment of a 
District Judge in an other proceeding. 
In the Intermill case this court quoted with approval 
from other courts which have held : 
"When the direct purpose and aim of the 
proceeding is to attain relief other than the set-
ting aside or modifying of the judgment, and the 
attack upon the judgment is involved merely in-
ridentally, the attack is collateraL" 
Plaintiff's present action clearly falls within the 
srope of that definition. 
CONCLUSION 
In this appeal, plaintiff has the burden to show 
affirmatively that the judgment of which he complains 
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was erroneous. The rule is as stated by this court rin 
Burton v. Zions Cooperative MercantiJle Institution 
(1952), 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2'd. 514: 
''There is a presumption that the judgment 
of the! trial court was correct, and every reason-
able intendment must be indulged in favor of it; 
the burden of affirmatively showing error is on 
the party complaining thereof." 
Tested by this rule, and even allowing for the fact 
that plaintiff is not represented by a lawyer, it is obvious 
that plaintiff has not shown how or in what manner he 
might be entitled to relief under any statement or impli-
cation of fact in his amended complaint, and he· has pre-
sented nothing to this court to avoid the obvious 
conclusion that his present suit constitutes a collateral 
attack upon an earlier proceeding in the District Court. 
Under these circu1nstances, the judgment of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County should be affirmed 
and this oppressive litigation thereby tenninated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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